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In this article, Thimmesch, Gamage, and
Shanske make the case that attention to in-state
consumers’ use tax compliance is not only
warranted but may be critical for the future of
consumption tax enforcement.

The debates regarding use tax enforcement
and the collection of “online sales tax” can
sometimes seem stale. The revenue problems
1
created by Quill and the failure of Congress to
respond are well known. Notwithstanding these
realities, though, there is still significant ground
to be covered on the use tax question. The
problems related to the collection and
enforcement of consumption taxes in the
modern world are not going away, and these
problems will continue to raise difficulties for
our tax systems and their enforcement.
This essay provides a fresh look at the use
tax issue by taking a somewhat different
approach. Most analyses of the use tax focus on
the relationship between states and remote
vendors, but that approach ignores a very
2
significant party — the in-state consumer.
Consumer compliance has been largely ignored
in the literature because it has generally been
assumed that consumers will never
3
meaningfully self-report their use tax liabilities.
But it is our view that this assumption may be
partially in error and should not end the
inquiry. Attention to in-state consumers’ use tax
compliance is not only warranted, but may be
critical for the future of consumption tax
enforcement.
This essay is the first in a planned series that
introduces several considerations supporting
the view articulated above. Two sets of
considerations will be discussed in this essay:

1

Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).

2

Much of this essay summarizes and expands upon two prior
pieces on the state use tax by one of the authors of this essay. See
Adam B. Thimmesch, “Taxing Honesty,” 118 W. Va. L. Rev. 147
(2015); and Thimmesch, “Testing the Models of Tax Compliance:
The Use-Tax Experiment,” 2015 Utah L. Rev. 1083 (2015).
3

Joel Slemrod, “Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax
Evasion,” 21 J. of Econ. Perspectives 25, 37 (2007) (stating the opinion
that use taxes are “largely unenforceable”).
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(1) economic and (2) rule of law considerations.
Planned future essays will consider consumerfocused approaches from a psychological and
compliance angle and will also provide specific
reform suggestions that states can take to
improve their use taxes.
The Use Tax Issue
The state use tax is relatively obscure
among the general public but is likely known
by readers of this publication, so its details will
not be fully explored here. Nonetheless, some
brief comments are helpful as we begin to
think more broadly about the tax and its
enforcement. To begin, discussions of the use
tax often equate it to the tax owed on online
purchases, but that is too narrow a
characterization. The use tax is an integral part
of the state system of consumption taxation,
and the tax applies in a wide variety of
situations.
In general, use tax is owed on any in-state
consumption, and states allow credits against
that tax for sales tax previously paid on the
purchase of the consumed item. This system
seeks to ensure that all in-state consumption
(of taxable items) is subject to consumption tax
regardless of where the purchase is made or
whether tax is collected at the point of sale. In
4
the days of National Bellas Hess and Quill, the
tax often applied when consumers purchased
items though catalogs. Today, online shopping
often triggers the use tax, but the tax also
applies in a number of other situations. The
most common examples include the
consumption of items purchased in a state
with a lower sales-tax rate than the state of
consumption and the consumption of items
originally purchased tax free as business
inputs or as inventory.5
Reminding ourselves that use taxes are
about more than collecting revenue on internet
sales is important because it helps to
counteract attempts to marginalize their

4

National Bellas Hess v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 753 (1967).

5

For more robust discussions of the use tax and its applications,
see Jerome R. Hellerstein and Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation, ch.
16 (3d ed.); and Thimmesch, “Taxing Honesty,” supra note 2, at 15560.
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importance in the design of states’ tax systems.
Use taxes are absolutely critical to the
functioning of a broad-based consumption tax,
at least for any such tax that is structured
similar to the subnational retail sales taxes we
have now. Opponents of sales and use tax
reform sometimes use terms like “internet
sales tax” to create the impression that there is
a revenue grab at play in efforts to increase
6
sales and use tax compliance. But the use tax
has always been about shoring up a leaky
consumption tax, and that has become more
critical in recent years with sales tax avoidance
becoming much easier and states relying more
7
heavily on consumption taxes.
What Is Being Done Today?
The traditional approach to use tax
compliance has been to focus on getting
vendors to collect taxes at the point of sale, and
states have attempted a wide range of
approaches in that vein. Some states have
adopted statutes that attempt to fight entity
isolation by attributing physical presences
between related entities. Other states have
adopted click-through nexus statutes that
8
apply a Tyler Pipe-like attributional nexus
regime to the digital world. A more recent
approach is for states to impose information
reporting obligations on noncollecting
vendors, potentially making it more practical

6

Americans for Tax Reform, for example, has labeled the MFA a
“huge internet sales tax.” See “The Marketplace Fairness Act: A
Huge Internet Sales Tax,” Americans for Tax Reform (May 23,
2017). More generally, some third-party organizations funded by
and acting on behalf of some e-commerce retailers have
campaigned against efforts to improve sales and use tax
compliance and in doing so have promoted and exacerbated the
misconception that some purchases are tax-exempt solely because
those purchases were made on the internet.
7

Further, recent federal tax reform discussions have included
considerations of a VAT or border-adjusted taxes, which both raise
similar issues regarding cross-border transactions with required
self-reporting. See, e.g., Brian Galle, “The Effect of a Federal DBCFT
on U.S. States, and Vice-Versa: A Compromise Proposal,”
Medium.com, Feb. 4, 2017; and David Gamage and Darien
Shanske, “Tax Cannibalization and Fiscal Federalism in the United
States,” 111 Nw. U.L. Rev. 295, 353-367 (2017).
8

Tyler Pipe Industries Inc. v. Washington Department of Revenue,
483 U.S. 232 (1987).
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for those vendors to just collect the tax. States
have also pushed for federal legislation like the
9
Marketplace Fairness Act (MFA).
Notwithstanding this focus on vendorcentric approaches, states have not completely
ignored consumers’ individual reporting
obligations. Many states have included a line to
10
report use tax on their income tax returns.
Some states make it even simpler for taxpayers
to report use tax by providing tables that
11
taxpayers can use to estimate their liabilities.
Other states have engaged in public education
efforts.12 Together, those approaches have had
some effect, but none have generated
substantial levels of compliance. For instance,
one study showed that the percentage of
consumers who self-report use tax is less than 2
13
percent. Based on that figure, it is clear why
states have focused their attention on vendors.
The difficulties and inefficiencies of getting
consumers to pay use tax of their own accord
are not lost on us. Nevertheless, there are
compelling reasons for states to try. These
reasons include economic efficiency, concerns
regarding the rule of law, and the impact of
states’ efforts on tax compliance more generally.
The first two of these reasons are discussed
below, with a discussion of compliance saved
for a follow-up essay.
The Economic Case for Consumer-Focused
Use Tax Enforcement
It is clear why states have focused their use
tax enforcement efforts on vendors — simple
administrative efficiency. Collecting tax from
vendors is much easier than doing so from their

customers, one by one. Vendor-based collection
approaches are not perfect, though, and they
will leave significant uncollected revenue even
if they are successful. Quite simply, states will
never have completely unfettered power to
require remote vendors to collect their taxes.
Whether under their own statutes, the U.S.
Constitution, or a federal statutory de minimis
14
rule like that in the MFA, states will always
rely to some extent on voluntary compliance by
those who purchase goods from “smaller”
online retailers or other retailers that the state
cannot reach.
It might seem like few retailers would fall
into those categories, but that is not necessarily
the case. To begin, “small” retailers do a
significant amount of commerce in the
aggregate. One study estimated that online
commerce by retailers that fall within the MFA’s
small seller exception represents over 40
15
percent of total annual online sales. Further,
many of the large vendors that make the
remaining sales already collect sales tax in
many states. The study’s authors thus estimated
that if passed, the MFA, with its small seller
exception, would reduce the use tax gap by less
16
than 50 percent. If those numbers are accurate,
states will have to go further if they want to
collect the taxes that are due.17
One other significant impediment to
achieving a high level of tax compliance
through vendor-centric approaches is the
simplicity of retailer substitution by consumers.
To the extent that consumers can shift their
consumption to protected vendors, states’
revenue gains from expansions of their
enforcement power will be reduced.
Unfortunately for states, research suggests this

9

That legislation would expand state authority, but not
completely. The current bill contains a de minimis rule that would
protect vendors with revenues of $1 million or less from remote
sales in the preceding calendar year. Marketplace Fairness Act, S.
976, section 2(c) (2017). For prior discussion of federal legislative
approaches to the e-commerce sales and use tax problem, see
Andrew J. Haile, Gamage, and Shanske, “A Potential Game
Changer in E-Commerce Taxation,” State Tax Notes, Mar. 11, 2013,
p. 747.
10

Thimmesch, “Testing the Models of Tax Compliance: The
Use-Tax Experiment,” supra note 2, at 1111-1112.
11

Id.

12

Id. at 1113-1114.

13

Nina Manzi, “Use Tax Collection on Income Tax Returns in
Other States,” Minnesota House of Representatives Research
Department (Apr. 2015).

14

See supra note 6.

15

Donald Bruce and William F. Fox, “An Analysis of Internet
Sales Taxation and the Small Seller Exemption,” Small Business
Administration, Office of Advocacy (Nov. 2013).
16

Id. at 40.

17

Consider, too, the impact of increasing the small seller
exception, something that might be a natural bargaining chip by
members of Congress looking to obtain additional votes on a bill.
Using the additional authority granted under federal legislation
would also require that states conform to any required
simplification provisions. See Thimmesch, “Taxing Honesty,” supra
note 2, at 164 (discussing the MFA’s simplification requirements).
States unwilling to do so will be required to pursue other avenues.
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18

is already occurring. People who want to avoid
paying tax on their online purchases are still
shopping on Amazon.com; they are just buying
from the small vendors that use the platform
instead of from Amazon itself. Avoiding use tax
often requires only one mouse click.
At the end of the day, the reality is that states
should not be optimistic that the MFA, or
similar legislation, will completely close the
current use tax gap. Any legislative approach
that contains a small seller exception will likely
leave significant revenue beyond states’ reach,
and consumer demand will flow to those
protected zones. States will therefore always
have an economic interest in taking consumercentric enforcement activities if they want to
rely on consumption taxation to a substantial
degree.
Moreover, the challenge posed by consumer
compliance extends beyond state-level sales
and use taxes. Even structurally superior
consumption taxes, namely credit-invoice
VATs, have increasing problems with
19
compliance in connection with e-commerce. In
that context, the OECD tells a familiar tale,
noting that “private consumers have little
incentive to declare and pay the tax due, at least
in the absence of meaningful sanctions for
20
failure to comply with such an obligation.”
The OECD’s approach to that problem has been
to focus on vendor collection and to promote
changes that would make VAT registration and
21
compliance simpler. Nevertheless, it
recognizes the need for proportionality and that
smaller vendors may need protection from
22
burdensome compliance costs. Thus, the
OECD approach would also benefit from a

18

Recent research shows that consumers respond quickly to the
collection of tax by online retailers. See, e.g., Liran Einav et al.,
“Sales Taxes and Internet Commerce,” 104 Am. Econ. Rev. 1, 24
(2014); Brian Baugh et al., “Can Taxes Shape an Industry: Evidence
From Implementation of the Amazon Tax,” National Bureau of
Economic Research Working Paper 20052 (Apr. 2014); and see also
Thimmesch, “Taxing Honesty,” supra note 2, at 165-166 (discussing
these studies in further detail).
19

Walter Hellerstein, “An Introduction to the OECD’s
International VAT/GST Guidelines,” 2016 J. of Tax’n 256, 262 (2016);
and OECD, “International VAT/GST Guidelines,” paras 3.128–134.
20

OECD, supra note 19, at para 3.130.

21

Hellerstein, supra note 19, at 262–264; and OECD, supra note
19, at paras 3.135-151.
22

OECD, supra note 19, at paras 3.150–151.
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complementary strategy to improve consumer
compliance.
Furthermore, individual-level compliance
is not just an issue for consumption taxes. It is
commonly noted that compliance with the
personal income tax is also tied to third-party
solutions, particularly withholding, but also
23
information reporting regimes. If it is true
that we are entering the “gig economy,” then
reliance on these types of mechanisms might
ultimately be undermined in much the same
way that the online economy undermined
vendor collection. One response to this threat
would be to put more obligations on even very
small businesses, just as we might require such
businesses to collect the use tax. Therefore,
even as to the income tax, it seems that we
should at least explore how we might get the
individual taxpayers themselves to take a more
meaningful role in compliance.
The Rule of Law Case for Use Tax Enforcement
The economic case for use tax enforcement
is relatively tangible — states need revenue,
and creating an online tax-free zone creates
unwelcome economic distortions. The rule of
law case is perhaps less apparent, but also
compelling. The classic modern analysis of the
components of the rule of the law comes from
24
Lon Fuller. He claims that legal rules must

23

See generally Leandra Lederman, “Reducing Information Gaps
to Reduce the Tax Gap: When Is Information Reporting
Warranted?” 78 Fordham L. Rev. 1733 (2010). It is worth noting here
that problems with use tax enforcement are in many ways similar
to the problems of enforcing income and payroll taxes in various
sectors of the cash economy, with these problems giving rise to
labels like “nanny taxes.” Just as labeling specific sales and use tax
enforcement measures as “internet taxes” exacerbates the
misconception that some purchases would otherwise be legally
free of tax because they were made on the internet, labels like
“nanny taxes” reflect confusion and misunderstanding about how
income and payroll taxes apply in the context of payments for
home care services. Like use taxes on e-commerce purchases, the
payroll and income tax liabilities owed on payments for home care
services have been notoriously difficult for tax agencies to enforce
and collect due in part to ignorance and confusion about taxpayers’
legal obligations in this context.
24

To be clear, we are talking about the status of the use tax as
law that should be respected in the first instance rather than
potential arguments about the distribution of the use tax burden or
of the inclusion of specific items in the tax base (e.g., the
application of consumption tax to food or medication). Lon L.
Fuller, The Morality of Law, 81–91 Yale University Press 2d ed.
(1969). See also John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 238–239 Belknap
Press (1971); and Joseph Raz, “The Rule of Law and Its Virtue,” The
Authority of Law 210, 218 Oxford University Press (1979).
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meet eight conditions before they can be
respected as law: They must be (1) generally
applicable, (2) publicly available, (3) generally
prospective in application, (4) understandable,
(5) free of contradictions, (6) structured so that
compliance is possible, (7) stable, and (8)
25
administered consistent with their wording.
Running through these eight features is the
theme that there must be a reciprocal
relationship between the governing and the
26
governed. Acting in a manner that advances
these eight features of a legal regime
constitutes, for Fuller, the inner morality of law.
Fuller is at pains to argue — and so are we —
that this inner morality is not to be understood
as a set of independent commandments as to
27
what one should or should not do. Rather,
these eight features indicate whether a legal
regime is functioning well on its own terms. The
current misfirings of the use tax illustrate
Fuller’s point nicely.
To understand why, consider Fuller’s eighth
requirement of a legal system: that there be
congruence “between the law as declared and
as actually administered.”28 State use tax laws
are necessarily broad so that the use tax can
serve as an effective backstop to the sales tax,
but these laws are not regularly enforced
against individual taxpayers. That creates an
incongruity between the law as written and as
enforced.
Of course, governments cannot perfectly
enforce every law. Governments often have
resource constraints that require them to focus
29
on the biggest offenders or offenses. For
example, the police are better served by
dedicating efforts to prevent an assault than an
incident of jaywalking. The nonpayment of use
tax could easily be likened to the latter, and we

have sometimes heard it discussed in that way.
That account is understandable, but
incomplete.
Unlike jaywalking or minor speeding, many
states proclaim that enforcing use taxes is
expected, and they signal that use taxes are
every bit as important to them as income taxes.
For example, many states have added use tax
30
lines to their income tax returns, and their tax
return instructions, websites, and other
communications often discuss the necessity of
31
reporting the tax. Some states’ voluntary
disclosure programs also specifically reference
use tax enforcement actions and individuals’
32
potential liabilities for taxes due in past years.
These state communications are certainly
warranted, but they create rule of law concerns
because they urge compliance even though
states take relatively few use tax enforcement
actions against individual taxpayers. That
incongruity is troubling partially because it
means the burden of the use tax is borne
primarily by the uninformed and the honest.
This is a clear violation of our reciprocal
obligations to one another. Yet this incongruity
is also troubling because it is reinforcing a
mixed message at a very inopportune time. As
already explained, it is becoming ever more, not
less, important that online commerce not be
perceived as a rule-free zone.
Fuller also argues that proper laws require
only actions that can be done. There can hardly
be a reciprocal relationship between the
government and the governed if the
government continues to request impossible
actions. 33 This is another issue for use tax
compliance. How many people could
accurately report their use taxes even if they
wanted to?

25

Fuller, The Morality of Law, Yale University Press 1st ed. (1964).

26

We will focus on the psychology of taxpayer compliance in
our next piece, though clearly there is a relationship between a
reciprocal relationship and whether there is compliance.
27

In other words, our argument is not reliant on whether the
positive law here is consistent with some higher law. (Our position
on whether there is a higher law is complicated.)
28

30

One important thing to keep in mind is that tax returns
generally include a jurat that requires taxpayers to attest to the
accuracy of the return under penalties of perjury. Perjury is, of
course, a serious crime and often a felony. See Thimmesch, “Taxing
Honesty,” supra note 2, at 172-173.
31

Fuller, supra note 25, at 81.

29

This applies to laws ranging from traffic laws to criminal law
to immigration laws. It also includes the tax laws. See Leigh
Osofsky, “Concentrated Enforcement,” 16 Fla. Tax Rev. 325, 333–338
(2014) (discussing the use of worst-first enforcement strategies).

32

Id. at 170-171.
Id. at 171 n.117.

33

See Fuller, supra note 24; and Michael Neumann, The Rule of
Law: Politicizing Ethics, 56-57 Ashgate (2002).
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Of course, compliance is technically possible
for taxpayers who carefully track, examine,
and recall every transaction. But the level of
effort required to be able to attest that one is
reporting correctly under penalties of perjury
is unreasonably high, given the dollars at stake
for many individual consumers. If states want
to generate a climate where taxpayers take
their tax obligations more seriously, the
current situation is untenable.
Fuller maintains that when a government’s
actions constitute a significant enough
deviation from his eight criteria, then that
action is hardly a law at all. State use tax laws
have not fallen quite so far, but they clearly
represent a troubling deviation from the ideal.
This is easy to see if one simply imagines the
state of affairs if all laws had the congruence
and compliance issues of state use tax laws.

Where to Go From Here?
The economic and rule of law considerations
discussed above suggest that states’ current focus
on getting vendors to collect their use taxes is
insufficient. That isn’t to say those efforts are in
error, just that they are not enough. If states want
a use tax that serves as an effective, lawful
backstop to their sales taxes, then states must also
focus on the consumer side of the equation and on
how they administer their use taxes. We will
explain what states might do to improve this
situation in a future essay on this topic.
For now, though, it is worth emphasizing that
our argument that states should focus more on
consumer-level compliance efforts in no way
implies that states should abandon vendor-level
compliance efforts. Indeed, it is our view that
consumer-level and vendor-level compliance
efforts can mutually reinforce one another and
that these two levels of effort work best in
34
tandem. 


34

This is partly because the current ignorance and confusion
about use tax responsibilities on the part of many consumers
creates a chicken-and-egg problem for state enforcement efforts.
Greater consumer-level enforcement is a necessary part of getting
consumers to understand their use tax obligations and to take these
obligations more seriously. But state tax enforcement agencies are
understandably reluctant to take more than limited enforcement
actions against consumers within the current environment in
which so many consumers commit use tax evasion out of confusion
and ignorance rather than doing so purposefully. Consequently,
enforcement measures aimed at improving the communications
about sales and use tax responsibilities that consumers see from
vendors at the time of purchase must be a key component of
consumer-level enforcement efforts. Some e-commerce vendors
have acted in ways that exacerbate consumers’ misconceptions
about sales and use tax responsibilities. At a minimum, increased
state-level regulation and enforcement actions are needed to
combat these unhelpful actions by vendors.
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